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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in identifying the separate property

portion of Husband's retirement plans? "A trial court has considerable discretion concerning property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption
of validity. We disturb a trial court's property division and valuation 'only when there is
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial
error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App
83 Tj 17, 45 P.3d 176 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Wife

and in the amount of that award? "An award of attorneys fees in divorce actions rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of
discretion." Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App.1994).
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL

1.

Did the trial court err in failing to treat Husband's interest in the Utah

Power & Light Company Deferred Compensation Plan as his sole and separate property
even though the plan's benefit level was frozen prior to the marriage? The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to this issue. This issue was
preserved at R. 373, pp. 756-57 and elsewhere.
2.

Did the trial court err in treating Husband's continuation of retirement in-

come from his basic retirement plan while the divorce was pending as an inappropriate

use of marital assets and charging those withdrawals to his separate property portion of
the account? The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to this issue. This issue was preserved at R. 373, p. 757 and elsewhere.
3.

Did the trial court err in making additional "equitable adjustments" which

were intended to and had the effect of diminishing the value of Husband's separate property interests? The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to this issue. The equitable adjustments were not advocated by either party and thus
no specific objection to them is recorded in the record; however, Husband objected to any
transfers of separate property to the marital estate absent a finding of exceptional circumstances at R. 373, pp. 750-51.
4.

Did the trial court err in treating Husband's Lenox collection as a marital

asset? The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to
this issue. This issue was preserved at R. 373, pp. 724-27, Exhibit P-49, and elsewhere.
5.

Did the trial court err in its alimony award, and particularly in including in

Husband's income the retirement withdrawals which it earlier treated as Husband's separate property rather than income? A trial court's determination of alimony is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983).

This

issue was preserved at Exhibit D-17 and in off the record meetings with the trial court
referenced at R. 373, p. 731.
6.

Respondent also contests the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees

to Wife, which is an issue raised by both parties to this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce entered by the Second Judicial
District Court of Davis County, Utah. (R. 328-31.) The parties have no minor children,
so the issues were limited to property division, alimony, and attorney's fees.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The Petition for Divorce was filed December 30, 2002. (R. 1-4). The court entered temporary orders by stipulation on February 4, 2003.] The case was tried to the
court on May 26, June 26, July 22, August 25, and October 1, 2004. (R. 228-29, 231-32,
235-36, 258-61.) The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 31027) and Decree of Divorce (R. 328-31) on March 2, 2005. Wife filed her Notice of Appeal April 1, 2005. (R. 348-49.) Husband filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on April 11,
2005. (R. 363-65.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ron and Brenda Oliekan (pronounced "o'-ta-kin") were married on February 13,
1993 and separated September 1, 2002. They have no minor children. Both parties had
been married before. Husband brought significant assets, including a home and a Lenox
collection, into the marriage, and both parties have premarital interests in retirement
benefits.

The temporary order is not in the record on appeal and could not be located in the
court's file during trial. A copy of the temporary order, however, was attached to Wife's
brief at Addendum F.
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At the time of trial, Wife was age 54. Wife had been employed by the State of
Utah as an office manager and supervisor in the department of Adult Probation and Parole for the past 11 years. She is in good health although she has been treated with medication for depression. (R. 311.) Her earnings were $3,896.71. (R. 324 J 60.) Wife's
employment was a continuation of the employment she had held prior to the marriage.
Husband was age 57 at the time of trial. He was retired from Utah Power & Light
Company and PacifiCorp, where he worked as a construction supervisor in line work and
substation construction. He began working for Utah Power & Light Company on April 7,
1969 and accepted an early retirement package from its successor company, PacifiCorp,
on March 1, 2001. He presently does consulting work on PacifiCorp jobs. He is in good
health, but has had back problems and takes medication for control of diabetes. (R. 311312 If 6.) Husband's income as a consultant was $5,204.39. (R. 324161.)
A.

The Parties' Retirement Plan Interests.

Wife was a participant in the Utah State Retirement System. She joined the plan
April 19, 1982 and accrued 3,953 days of service in the plan prior to the date of the marriage, and she remained employed by the State of Utah as of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this case. As of November 1, 2004, Wife had accrued 4,279 days of
service during the marriage. Husband was awarded a fraction of any benefit due under
the plan, the numerator of which is 4,279; and the denominator of which is 8,252, pursuant to the formula set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
(R. 312 If 10.)

-4-

During his employment, Husband accrued retirement benefits in three separate accounts:
(1)

Basic Retirement Plan

(2)

Deferred Compensation Plan

(3)

401(k)Plan

The Basic Retirement and Deferred Compensation plans were defined benefit retirement plans. (R. 370, p. 164.) Accordingly, they did not accrue account balances during the marriage. Instead, Husband earned a monthly retirement benefit which would be
calculated based upon his final average compensation and years of service in those plans.
When he accepted early retirement in March of 2001, he elected to convert his accrued
benefits in those plans to lump sum cash payments, which he rolled over into Individual
Retirement Accounts at World Financial Group. The lump sums were equal to the present value of the annuities the plans would otherwise have provided. (R. 369, p. 68.)
The 401(k) plan was a defined contribution plan. (R. 370, p. 164.) In other words,
that plan carried an account balance that increased based on contributions from salary,
employer matching contributions, and earnings on investments. When Husband retired in
2001, he rolled the account balance in the 401(k) over into an IRA at Fidelity Investments. (R. 3l31f 12.)
The trial court's approach to allocation of Husband's retirement benefits between
premarital and marital portions was simple. The court determined that the separate portion of the two defined benefit plans could be calculated as of the date of the lump sum
distribution using the Woodward formula. For the Deferred Compensation and Basic Re-
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tirement plans, the court determined how many days of service were reflected in the final
balances distributed from the plans on March 1, 2001. From April 7, 1969 through
March 1, 2001, 11,651 days of service accrued. Of those days, 8,714, or 74.79 percent,
occurred prior to the marriage date of February 13, 1993. Accordingly, applying the
Woodward formula, 74.79 percent of the benefit in these plans that was distributed on
March 1, 2001 accrued prior to marriage and was Husband's separate property.
The trial court further found that once the two portions were separately identified,
earnings attributable to those portions took on the same characterization as the principal.
Thus, the court determined that the ratio established on March 1, 2001 continues to apply
to the funds in those accounts.
The 401(k) computation was done differently to reflect the accrual of an account
balance in the plan over time. At the time of the marriage, the balance in the 401(k) plan
was $29,915.85. The court calculated the rate of return earned by the plan each year during the marriage, and applied that rate of return to the premarital balance on an annual
basis to arrive at its final determination of the premarital portion of the 401(k) plan.
(R. 314 % 16.)
The trial court's calculations, as well as its treatment of Husband's early retirement incentives, are discussed below.
1.

PacifiCorp Basic Retirement Plan.

The PacifiCorp Basic Retirement Plan was a defined benefit plan. From his original hire date of April 7, 1969 through his retirement on March 1, 2001, Husband accrued
11,651 days of service. Of those days, 8,714, or 74.79 percent, accrued prior to the mar-
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riage. (R.319, ^f 35.) At the time of his retirement, Husband received the funds in this
account in a lump sum distribution of $250,251.23. Those funds were rolled over into
World Financial Group account no. ******3916. (R. 313-14 ^ 14; R. 319 fl 34, 35.)
The trial court found that Husband's Basic Retirement Plan was a defined benefit
plan and thus had no ascertainable account balance at any time prior to its conversion to a
lump sum on March 1, 2001. R. 319 % 34.) The terms and conditions of the Basic Plan
are described in Exhibit D-13. The court rejected Wife's contention that the separate portion of the Basic Plan could be calculated based upon the amount that would have been
distributed under the plan's benefit formula if Husband had been permitted to retire on
February 13, 1993 because he was not eligible for retirement on that date and thus could
not have received that amount, and because adopting that calculation would result in
years of service for benefit accrual not being treated equally. (R. 320 ^f 38.)
After accounting for withdrawals (discussed below), the trial court divided the Basic Retirement Plan as follows (R. 321 ^| 39):
June 16 2004
Value

Add withdrawals During Separation

Add interest
on withdrawals

Cash value
prior to withdrawals

$ 5,464.00

$ 260,519.17

$

$

$

$ (46,200.00)

$ (33,600.00)

,$,,_51464_.QQ

$ 260.519.17

$

$ 161.247 14

Basic Retirement

$175,255.17

$

Withdrawals during Separation

$

$

Total

_$175355. .17

2.

$

79,800.00

79.80000

Marital Portion
(25.21%)
65,672.03

19 47203

Pre Marital Portion (74.79%) !
$ 194,847.14

Utah Power & Light Company Deferred Compensation Plan.

Husband was a participant in the Utah Power & Light Company Deferred Compensation Plan prior to and during the marriage. This plan was a defined benefit plan. At
the time of his retirement, Husband received the funds in this account in a lump sum dis-7-

tribution of $146,430.58. Those funds were rolled over into World Financial Group account no. ******3915. (R. 313 H 13.)
The court found that the Deferred Compensation Plan ("DCP") was a defined
benefit plan and thus had no ascertainable account balance at any time prior to its conversion to a lump sum on March 1, 2001. (R. 317 ^ 26.) The terms and conditions of the
DCP are described in Restated Appendix D of Exhibit D-13. The trial court divided the
funds in the DCP using the same Woodward ratio it used to divide the Basic Retirement
Plan (R. 317 If 27), and rejected Wife's contention that a 1993 benefit value could be ascertained for the same reasons it rejected that argument under the Basic Retirement Plan.
(R. 318 H 30.)
The DCP, however, was different from the Basic Retirement Plan because benefit
levels under the DCP were frozen in 1990. The purpose of that action was "to freeze the
benefit levels accrued at that time based on earnings levels then in effect." (Ex. D-13,
p. 47.) Eligibility to participate in the DCP was determined based upon employment
status on October 11, 1989, and the plan provided fixed benefit levels based on a participant's earnings as of January 1, 1990. (Id., p. 47 ^ 1.1, p. 48 % 3.1.) Husband's benefit
level was frozen at $1,820 per month for 180 months based on his earnings of between
$40,000 and $50,000 as of that time. (R. 370, p. 181.) Following 1990, the DCP provided that a participant's level of benefits depended on the participant's age upon retirement. A participant who retired at age 65 received 100 percent of the 1990 benefit level
specified in the plan. The percentage dropped to 93 percent if retirement occurred at age
64, and continued on a sliding scale to 51 percent if retirement occurred at age 55. (Id.,
-8-

p. 49.) Wife erroneously describes this provision of the DCP as accrual of "years of service." In fact, years of service were irrelevant to the calculation. The calculation was
based strictly upon age at retirement, not years of service, and is more appropriately characterized as an interest rate calculation. Husband earned no benefit in the DCP after
1989. (R. 369, pp. 65-66.) The payment Husband received in 2001 was the monetary
equivalent of the benefit that existed in 1990. (R. 370, p. 176.) In other words, the
change in value of the benefit from 1990 to 2001 was due to passive appreciation. (See
id., pp. 176-77.) In Husband's case, a discount rate of 5.25% was used to calculate the
present lump sum value of his DCP benefit as of his date of actual retirement in 2001.
(R. 370, p. 185.) Husband had met all qualifications for his benefits under the DCP prior
to the date of marriage in this case. (R. 370, pp. 183-85.)
Because benefit levels were frozen in 1990 and years of service did not accrue after that date, Husband contended that the DCP was entirely a premarital asset. The court
acknowledged that the plan's benefit level was frozen under the DCP prior to the marriage, but nevertheless included a portion of the DCP in the marital estate because "the
parties' work together during the years of the marriage allowed Mr. Oliekan to retire, and
[Husband] was required to be an employee on the date of retirement in order to qualify
for the benefit." The court characterized its decision as an "equitable adjustment for the
time of [Wife's] contribution to the marriage." (R. 318 If 31.)
After accounting for withdrawals (discussed below), the trial court divided the
DCP as follows (R. 319 If 32):

-9-

June 16 2004
Value

Add withdrawals during
separation

Add interest
on withdrawals

Cash value
prior to withdrawals

$125,234.70

$

$ 3,272.91

Withdrawals during Separation

$

$

Total

$125.234.70

$

Deferred Comp Plan

3.

25,200.00

2520000

Marital Portion
(25.21%)

Pre Marital Portion (74.79%)

$ 153,707.61

$

38,746.83

$ 114,960.79

$

$

$

(700.00)

$ 3.272.91

$ 153 707 61

S

3804683

$ (24,500.00)
$

90,460.79

PacifiCorp 401 (k) Plan.

Husband was a participant in the PacifiCorp 401(k) plan prior to and during the
marriage. This plan was a defined contribution plan. At the time of his retirement, Husband received the funds in this account in a lump sum distribution of $186,676.67. Those
funds were rolled over into Smedley Financial Services account no. *******0400.
(R. 313 112.)
On the date of marriage, Husband's 401(k) plan had an account balance of
$29,915.85. That balance included a loan of $8,664.73 against the account which was
deducted from that beginning balance, resulting in an adjusted beginning balance of
$21,251.12. The trial court applied the actual rate of return earned in the plan to determine the appreciation on that adjusted beginning balance from the date of the marriage
through the date of the distribution on March 1, 2001. The calculation of rates of return
was shown on Exhibit D-3A, page "Exhibit 4." Using that methodology, the court found
that the premarital portion of the final account balance on March 1, 2001 was $43,349.76,
calculated as follows:

Year
1993
1994
1995
1996

Days

321
365
365
365

Beginning
Balance
$21,251.12
$21,188.21
$21,770.87
$26,304.87

Return
-0.34%
2.75%
20.83%
8.32%
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$
$
$
$

Ending
Balance
21,188.21
21,770.87
26,304.87
28,493.30

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

365
365
365
365
90

$28,493.30
$30,915.30
$34,589.52
$37,145.72
$43,464.64

8.50%
11.88%
7.39%
17.01%
-1.07%

$
$
$
$
$

30,915.30
34,589.52
37,145.72
43,464.64
43,349.76

Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that, as of March 1, 2001, $43,349.76,
or 23.22 percent, of the total amount of $186,676.67 in this account on March 1, 2001
was Husband's premarital property. (R. 314-15 ^ 16.)
The rate of return was calculated from statements that disclosed beginning and
ending balances for each relevant year. Roger Smith, Husband's financial expert, ascertained the total growth of the account in each calendar year, then adjusted that total
growth to account for loans and contributions during the year. Those calculations permitted Mr. Smith to isolate the rate of growth in investment value, or what Wife in her brief
refers to as "passive" appreciation. (R. 369, p. 71; R. 370, pp. 122-23, 134.) There is no
merit to Wife's contention that the rate of return calculated by Mr. Smith and relied upon
by the trial court, included more than passive growth in investment value during the marriage.2
4.

Early Retirement Incentives.

Husband's employer, PacifiCorp, decided to reduce its workforce in 2001. As part
of its Workforce Transition Retirement Program, PacifiCorp offered Husband the oppor-

2

Mr. Smith's exhibit (D-3A) described these figures as "estimates" because the parties
did not have copies of every monthly statement during the marriage. (R. 369, p. 70.) Mr.
Smith did, however, have year-end statements for every year, and testified that he assumed contributions and earnings occurred evenly through the year. (R. 370, pp. 131-32,
135-38.)
-11-

tunity to retire early under the terms of that program with enhanced benefits, as identified
in Exhibits D-7, D-14, and D-15.
As part of his early retirement, Husband was provided with certain incentives applicable to the defined benefit plans. (R. 318 % 29.) Those incentives included the calculation of benefits using two additional years of service and two additional years of age
under the plan formula (R. 370, pp. 187-88), and the provision of a Social Security
"bridge" benefit of $44,208.45. (R. 370, pp. 201-02.) The bridge benefit was the present
value of monthly payments of $500 to age 65. It was paid to compensate for the fact that
the employee will not be able to collect social security benefits until age 65. (R. 370,
p. 202.) The bridge benefit was included in the lump sum payment from the Basic Retirement Plan. (R. 370, p. 203.) As a final incentive, the interest rate used to calculate
the lump sum equivalent of the various plan payments was reduced from 5.83% to
5.25%, which had the effect of increasing the lump sum. (R. 370, pp. 183, 188.)3 The
trial court found that, although the foregoing incentives were made available to Husband
during the marriage, they were the result of all of his years of service under the plan, not
simply his years of service during the marriage (R. 318 ^ 20) and the record supports that
finding. (R. 370, pp. 275-76.) Eligibility for early retirement was based on completion
of 15 years of service, which Husband had in 1984, and attainment of age 53. (R. 370,
pp. 190-91.) Accordingly, the trial court concluded based on the evidence that the early
retirement incentives should be divided utilizing the same formula as was used to divide

3

The rather daunting arithmetic used in calculating the enhanced benefits is explained at
R. 370, pp. 190-200.
-12-

the portion of the distribution that was not the result of early retirement incentives.
(R. 3181129.)
5.

Withdrawals from Retirement Accounts.

During the pendency of this action, Husband withdrew certain sums from the parties' IRA accounts. The court found that some of those withdrawals violated the Temporary Order, and that Wife's interest in the marital estate should be made whole by treating
the withdrawals as having been withdrawn from Husband's separate property. (R. 315
118.)
At the time of his retirement in March 2001, Husband commenced monthly withdrawals of $2,100 from the Basic Retirement Plan. From March of 2001 and continuing
through the trial, Husband withdrew $2,100 per month from the Basic Plan. (R. 319-20
136.) In February of 2003, an order was entered in this case providing in paragraph 8,
"Each party is restrained and enjoined from selling, gifting, transferring, alienating,
pledging, or otherwise disposing of the parties' marital assets." That provision was part
of a temporary order which also provided for payment of $800 per month to Wife as temporary alimony and required Husband to make payments on all marital debt except the
second mortgage.4 In support of the motion for temporary alimony, Wife asserted that
the $2,100 per month withdrawals were part of Husband's income and thus part of his
ability to pay temporary alimony. (R. 10.) At trial, however, Wife reversed course, as-

4

See Appendix F to Wife's brief.
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serting that Husband's continued withdrawals of $2,100 per month following entry of the
Temporary Order violated paragraph 8 of the order.
Despite the lack of a clear prohibition in the Temporary Order of continuation of
the withdrawals, the trial court concluded, "Both as an equitable adjustment... and also
because of paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order, the monthly withdrawals from March
2003 through June of 2004 from the Basic Plan, in the total amount of $33,600, are
treated as marital property rather than income and are deemed to have been taken from
respondent's share of marital property. The balance of the withdrawals, $48,300, occurred during the marriage and prior to separation and is deemed to have come from
marital funds and not in violation of the Temporary Order." (R. 320 ^f 36.)
Husband made three additional post-separation withdrawals.

The first, for

$25,200 from the DCP, occurred January 15, 2003, before entry of the temporary order.
It was used to pay various joint and personal expenses. (Ex. D-3A, p. "Exhibit 7.") The
trial court found that all but $700 of this withdrawal should be charged to Husband's
separate funds (R. 317-18 ^ 28), even though it was undisputed that $2,163 of those funds
were used to pay the parties' joint 2002 taxes and $1,100 were used to pay car insurance
on the parties' vehicles. (Ex. D-3A, p. "Exhibit 7.")
The other two withdrawals were taken from the 401(k) funds. It was undisputed
that $4,780 of that money was used to pay joint taxes, and thus reduced a marital debt
(Ex. D-3A, p. "Exhibit 7"), but the court nevertheless charged the withdrawals entirely to
Husband. (R. 316 fl 20-21.)

-14-

B.

The Trial Court's'EquitableAdjustments"

When it made its ruling, the trial court announced several "equitable adjustments"
to the property division, each of which had the effect of reducing Husband's share in
marital property. The court justified the "equitable adjustments" as follows: "The Court
also recognizes that a large amount of the retirement benefits accrued during the marriage
during respondent's last years of service and intends to make some equitable adjustments
to recognize that." (R. 314 H 15.)
The "equitable adjustments" consisted of the following:
•

"The Court's decision to include the entire DCP as a marital asset is an equitable adjustment for the time of petitioner's contribution to the marriage
" (R. 318 If 31.) The effect of this "equitable adjustment was to include $38,746.83 of Husband's separate property in the marital estate. (See
R. 319 If 32.)

•

"Both as an equitable adjustment (see paragraph 15), and also because of
paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order, the monthly withdrawals from March
2003 through June of 2004 from the Basic Plan, in the total amount of
$33,600, are treated as marital property rather than income and are deemed
to have been taken from respondent's share of marital property." (R. 320
137.)

•

"Respondent should be awarded the 1998 GMC truck at a net value of zero.
Although the debt exceeds the value of the truck by approximately $2,500,
the Court has determined that the value should be set at zero as an equitable
-15-

adjustment (see paragraph 15) and taking into consideration that respondent
had the use of the truck since it was purchased." (R. 323 *| 50.)
•

"Respondent should be awarded the Dutchmen Lite 26FK trailer at a net
value of zero. Although the debt exceeds the value of the trailer by approximately $2,100, the Court has determined that the value should be set
at zero as an equitable adjustment (see paragraph 15) and taking into consideration that respondent had the use of the trailer since it was purchased."
(R. 323 H 51.)

The cumulative effect of the foregoing "equitable adjustments" was to reduce
Husband's separate property by $38,746.83 and Husband's share of the marital estate by
$38,200.00. The trial court made no findings of exceptional circumstances which would
justify these adjustments.
C.

Facts Regarding the Lenox Collection.

Prior to and during the marriage, Husband had accumulated a collection of Lenox
porcelain figurines. At trial, he specifically identified those pieces which had been acquired prior to marriage, those which had been acquired later, and those which had been
inherited. (Ex. P-49.) Husband challenges the trial court's factual finding that the Lenox
collection should be included in the marital estate and therefore marshals the evidence on
this point as follows:
Husband testified that he began collecting Lenox in 1971 or 1972. (R. 371,
p. 448.) In addition to his own collection, he began gifting Lenox figurines to his mother
long before the marriage. (Id.) Husband specifically identified in his testimony the
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pieces that had been purchased by the parties for themselves during the marriage (R. 372,
pp. 724-27) and which pieces he had purchased either for his mother or for himself prior
to the marriage (Ex. P-49). Wife admitted that the Lenox bird collection had been gifted
to Husband's mother, and then inherited by Husband upon his mother's death in December 2002. (R. 371, pp. 389, 412; R. 372, p. 625.) These are the only evidentiary references to the Lenox collection in the record.
Despite that clear evidence regarding the separate nature of most of the Lenox collection, the trial court included all of the Lenox collection in the marital estate. This had
the effect of overstating the value of the marital estate by $3,120.35. (See ex. P-49.)
D.

The Trial Court fs Alimony Calculation.

The trial court found that Husband had an ability to pay alimony of $450 per
month, and ordered him to pay $500 per month to Wife for a period of 118 months. It
based the $50 discrepancy on a finding that Husband had commenced a relationship with
another woman before his final separation from Wife. (R. 325fflj63-64.)
In determining Husband's ability to pay, however, the trial court included in Husband's income the $2,100 per month withdrawals from the Basic Retirement Plan that it
had earlier characterized as distributions of property. (R. 324-25 ^ 61.) Thus, in effect,
the court ordered husband to pay $59,000 ($500 X 118 months) of his property to Wife in
monthly installments. The trial court's treatment of those withdrawals as property for
purposes of its "equitable adjustment" and finding that the Temporary Order had been
violated, and as income for purposes of the alimony calculation, was inconsistent.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court's treatment of the proceeds of the defined benefit plans was fundamentally sound. Although they had been converted to present value and cashed out, the
difficulties inherent in valuing defined benefit interests still persisted with regard to
valuation of the interests on the date of marriage. The trial court's approach gave equal
weight to each year of service and thus did not commit the infraction identified in and
remedied by Woodward. The trial court's rejection of the figures contained in Exhibit P4 was based on evidence demonstrating that the figures were unreliable, and was accordingly entitled to deference.
Similarly, the trial court properly rejected Wife's commingling argument. That
argument is also a factual argument, and Wife's position ignores Mr. Smith's testimony
that although the funds were deposited together, the marital and separate portions could
still be identified. The trial court's findings on this issue were also entitled to deference.
The trial court also properly ascertained the marital portion of the 401(k) plan. Its
approach was to identify the balance as of the date of marriage, and to credit that balance
with the investment income it earned during the marriage. Contrary to Wife's claims, the
trial court's factual findings were supported by evidence that passive appreciation had
been isolated from contributions. Once again, the trial court's findings are sound and entitled to deference.
The trial court's treatment of the DCP plan, however, was erroneous. The evidence was clear and undisputed that benefits under the DCP were frozen in 1990 and that
the only thing Husband received from that plan was the benefit he had earned as of 1990,
-18-

adjusted by an interest rate calculation. The trial court's findings seem to acknowledge
this fact, describing the reason for including the DCP in the marital estate as an "equitable adjustment." Nevertheless, to the extent it was not an "equitable adjustment," it was
contrary to the clear and uncontroverted evidence.
The trial court also erred in punishing Husband with over $70,000 in "equitable
adjustments" designed to compensate Wife for the alleged fact that the defined benefit
plans grew more rapidly as Husband approached retirement. The court's justification
contravenes Woodward, which requires that years of service be treated equally. It also
suggests a reliance on the discredited 1993 benefit statements. Regardless, the "equitable
adjustments" are not supported by "commendably detailed findings" demonstrating an
extraordinary or exceptional circumstance which demands a remedy. The "equitable adjustments" should be reversed.
The trial court also erred in including the entire Lenox collection in the marital estate. The evidence was uncontroverted that $3,120.35 in value of the collection was either acquired prior to marriage or was inherited from Husband's mother.
The trial court's treatment of Husband's monthly $2,100 withdrawals from the Basic Retirement Plan was also erroneous. The court implicitly found that Husband was in
contempt of the Temporary Order by continuing these withdrawals, even though the
Temporary Order was premised on including the $2,100 per month in Husband's income.
The evidence was not clear and convincing that Husband knew the order would be interpreted to require that those withdrawals terminate following entry of the Temporary Or-
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der. This decision was also improper as an "equitable adjustment," for the reasons discussed above.
The alimony order demonstrates the defects in the treatment of the $2,100 per
month withdrawals as dissipation of marital property. In awarding alimony, the trial
court adopted the inconsistent position that the $2,100 monthly withdrawals were not
property, but income available for payment of alimony. Without that money, Husband
plainly had no ability to pay alimony based upon the trial court's findings. The trial
court's alimony award, when considered in conjunction with the finding that the withdrawals were dissipation of property in violation of the Temporary Order, effectively requires the transfer in installments of an additional $59,000 of Husband's property to
Wife. The result imposed by the trial court on this issue was not only inconsistent, but
inequitable and contrary to law.
Finally, the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Wife, while entitled to deference, was an abuse of discretion in this instance. It did not appropriately take into account the financial burdens placed on Husband by the court's order. It was erroneously
based on a belief that Wife needed to preserve her retirement assets, but failed to acknowledge that Husband had the same need and that, with no other identified source for
payment, the award required Husband to invade his own remaining retirement assets in
order to make the ordered payment.
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ARGUMENT

I.

HUSBAND'S PREMARITAL PROPERTY MUST BE EXCLUDED FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE IN THIS CASE.

Utah law is well-settled that in a divorce, premarital property must be returned to
the spouse who owned it before the marriage. There are exceptions to the general rule,
but none is applicable here:
The general rule is that equity requires that each party retain the
separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property. Exceptions to this general rule include
whether the property has been commingled, whether the other spouse has
by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property, and whether the distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable result.
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted). Accord,
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
According to Burt, the appropriate procedure is for the trial court to first return
premarital property to the spouse who brought it into the marriage. 799 P.2d at 1172
("the court should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other"). "Generally, trial courts are also required to award premarital property, and appreciation on that property, to the spouse who
brought the property into the marriage." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 ^ 18, 45 P.3d
176. The court is then to divide the remaining marital estate equitably. There is a strong
presumption that the marital estate should be divided in half absent exceptional circumstances. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172 ("[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or
her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property").
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In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
explained that property acquired by one spouse either by gift or inheritance becomes a
part of the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an
interest therein to the other spouse." 760 P.2d at 308.
II.

THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF HUSBAND'S BASIC RETIREMENT PLAN AND HIS 401(K) PLAN WAS CORRECT,
BUT ITS TREATMENT OF THE DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLAN WAS NOT.
A.

The Court Properly Ascertained the Marital Portion of the
Basic Retirement Plan.

There are several methods for dividing retirement benefits. The appropriateness of
a given method depends upon the nature of the retirement assets in issue. A defined
benefit retirement plan is a plan that does not carry an account balance. The amount of
benefit to be received depends upon the number of years of service the participant completes, and may be tied to other factors as well.
In a defined benefit plan, the benefit which is promised is calculated by a
formula defined in the pension plan provisions. The employer pays a specified benefit at retirement. In some defined benefit plans, the employee contributes nothing; in others, the benefits are based, in part, on what the employee contributes. The employer's contribution to the plan, however, varies from year to year based on the amount which is needed at any particular
time to pay the benefits which are due. Individual accounts of each employee's contribution, if any, are maintained, but these accounts do not
specify an employer contribution.
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In a defined contribution plan, however, individual accounts specify
not only the employee's contribution, but the employer's as well. The
benefits to be paid in the defined contribution plan, however, unlike those
in the defined benefit plan, are not fixed, for they depend upon the performance of investments which are made with the contributions.
Berrington v. Berrington, 534 Pa. 393, 633 A.2d 589, 590 n.l (1993).
Thus, at the time of the divorce, a defined benefit retirement plan may not have a
value that can be determined without resort to speculation. In this case, the trial court
properly found that the Basic Retirement Plan and DCP were defined benefit plans.
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), describes the proper way to
ascertain the marital and separate portions of a defined benefit plan. In that case, husband had been an employee of Hill Air Force Base for 15 years. He had to complete 30
years of service to receive maximum retirement benefits, and the amount of those future
benefits would not be fixed until his retirement. Accordingly, the trial court could not arrive at a fixed dollar amount for division in the case without speculating and thus inappropriately placing the risk of future uncertainty on one spouse or the other. Because of
the difficulty in placing a present value on the future benefits to be derived from such a
"defined benefit" plan, the Supreme Court approved a method of dividing the retirement
asset based on the ratio of years of service during the marriage to total years of service at
the time benefits commence. The Court indicated that this fixed percentage method of
distribution applied "'where no present value can be established.'" 656 P.2d at 433
(quoting Kikkert v. KikkerU 177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1981)).
In this case, the Woodward formula was properly applied to determine the premarital portion of the March 1, 2001 distributions. The plans were defined benefit plans
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which did not accrue account balances. The value of the benefit could not be established
until Husband retired. Thus, there was no other way to ascertain a present value of the
plans as of the date of the marriage.
Wife offers three criticisms of the trial court's application of Woodward in this
case. First, she contends that it was improper to apply the Woodward formula to interests
which eventually were converted to lump sums. Second, she contends that a document
admitted into evidence as Exhibit P-4 established a value of the Basic Retirement Plan
and DCP interests as of the date of the marriage. Third, she contends that by leaving the
funds in a single account after March 1, 2001, Husband "commingled" the funds so that
his separate property lost its separate character.
1.

The Trial Court's Approach to Identification of Separate and Marital Property, and Its Rejection of the Exhibit P-4 Analysis, Was Correct.

Wife claims that, because PacifiCorp told Husband that the plan formula would
have given him $46,148.94 from the Basic Retirement Plan and $67,994.24 from the
DCP if he had been able to retire in 1993, those figures establish the premarital portion of
his benefits. Wife's approach violates the Woodward rule and is inconsistent with the
Woodward rationale.
The trial court's determination of the amount of money to be excluded from the
marital estate as Husband's separate property, including its rejection of the Exhibit P-4
analysis, was a factual determination which is entitled to deference. Wife's contention
that a meaningful value could be assigned to defined benefit plan interests in 1993, while
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Husband was still working, is fundamentally flawed and contrary to law. The trial court
properly rejected it.
Wife's analysis is flawed because Husband was not able to receive the amounts
stated in Exhibit P-4 in 1993 or at any other time. Exhibit P-4 was a mathematical calculation based strictly on the benefit formula set forth in the plan, but without any consideration of Husband's eligibility for retirement in 1993. The trial court specifically found
that Husband "was not eligible for retirement [in 1993] and thus could not have received
that amount...." (R. 318 ^ 30; R. 320138.)
More importantly, Wife's proposal is directly contrary to Woodward. Indeed, it is
the approach rejected in Woodward. Consider the result if this divorce had been occurring in 1993, and Husband contended that the plan benefit formulas should be applied as
though he was going to retire in 1993. That is precisely what the court rejected in Woodward because the benefit would inevitably have been undervalued at that time. In that
case, in order to receive maximum benefits from the plan, Mr. Woodward had to participate for 30 years. At the conclusion of 30 years, the government would match his contributions to the plan. Mr. Woodward argued that the court should apply the benefit formula as of the date of divorce, after 15 years of service, and that the government matching contribution should not be counted because it would occur after the marriage. The
court rejected that argument because "his pension benefits, including any contribution by
the government, are as dependent on the first fifteen years as the last fifteen." 656 P.2d at
433. The only fair way to divide the benefit was on the basis of years of service, because
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that was the only way to give equal weight to each year of service upon which the full retirement benefit was based.
The flaw in Wife's analysis in this case is that she does not give equal weight to
each year of service. If Wife's analysis were correct, it would be just as correct to ask
PacifiCorp to tell us what benefit would accrue to a person hired February 14, 1993 and
retiring in 2001. Plainly, the total of those figures, the benefit supposedly earned up to
February 14, 1993, and the benefit supposedly earned after that date, would not add up to
the total benefit Husband earned. This is because the retirement formula heavily weights
the fact that the participant has completed a full 30 years of service and attained retirement age, The 24 years of service before the marriage are just as important as the 8 years
after marriage in computing the final benefit, and it is impossible to do an interim calculation that incorporates the full final benefit. Mr. Smith testified:
[Y]ou need all the years of service from the start date through the retirement date to get the number that you get on the lump sum. Without that
you couldn't get it—you can't bifurcate that, if you will, because you need
both the premarital and marital portion to get that total. If you were just to
look at the marital term of say eight years or so, that would be a very small
amount in the actual calculation. So you need both the premarital years, 23
years of serve, plus the eight years or so of marital service. You add that up
and that's how you'd get your total at the end. You need both. (R. 370,
p. 209.)
You should treat them all [years of service] equally. You need to
have kind of like a train, you need to have the engine and the caboose and
that's the calculation using them both. (R. 370, p. 276.)
Exhibit P-4 did not reflect such an analysis, and thus did not provide a reliable or
accurate measure of the value of Husband's benefits as of February 13, 1993. The trial
court was well within its discretion in rejecting it.
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2.

The Woodward Analysis Was Correct Even Though
the Benefits Had Been Reduced to Present Value and
Distributed In a Lump Sum.

Wife next argues that, at the time of trial, all of Husband's retirement monies resided in IRA defined contribution plans. Because Woodward does not apply to defined
contribution plans, and because Husband was no longer an employee of PacifiCorp, Wife
argues that use of the Woodward formula was automatically improper.
The fact that Mr. Oliekan is no longer employed by PacifiCorp does not change
the applicability of the Woodward formula. In Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P.2d 991 (Utah
1986), a challenge to application of the Woodward formula in a setting where the employed spouse was no longer employed by the company providing the benefit was rejected as "frivolous." 729 P.2d at 992.
Although the retirement benefits now reside in defined contribution plans, it was
undisputed that the lump sum distributions simply represented the present value of the
equivalent defined benefit. The alternative Wife offers is exactly the methodology the
court rejected in Woodward because of its tendency to undervalue retirement benefits
which are payable at some time in the future, based on factors which are unknown at the
time of valuation. The relevant issue is not what is the status of the plans today, but what
was their status in 1993, the date of Wife's attempted valuation. Woodward provides the
proper framework for answering that question. The trial court properly rejected Wife's
proposal as both factually and legally incorrect.
The Woodward formula applies here because each year of service in the plan
counts the same in computing the final benefit. It is not possible to determine what por-27-

tion of Husband's benefit is attributed to the first 24 years of employment and what portion is attributable to the last 8. Wife's analysis suggests that the first 24 years were
worth only $4,756 per year, while the last 8 were worth $32,582.86 per year. It means
that even though 75 percent of Husband's work to earn his final retirement benefit occurred prior to the marriage, 70 percent of the benefit he earned would be included in the
marital estate. Plainly, the plan did not work that way. Wife's proposed analysis is not
consistent with common sense, equitable principles, or Utah law. Woodward requires
that in this setting the division be based on years of service performed to earn the benefit.
The trial court understood this:
The Court in the following treatment of respondent's retirement
plans has attempted to identify the marital portion earned during the eight
years the of marriage prior to March 1, 2001, by giving equal credit for
each year of respondent's service in the plans. The Court believes that its
decision to give equal credit for each year of respondent's service in the
plans is consistent with the approach set forth in Woodward v. Woodward,
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), although the Court also recognizes that the
formulas that it is applying are not strictly Woodward formulas because the
benefits were converted to lump sums before the end of the marriage. The
Court also recognizes that a large amount of the retirement benefits accrued
during the marriage during respondent's last years of service and intends to
make some equitable adjustments to recognize that. (R. 314 Tf 15.)
The authorities relied upon by Wife (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36) do not support
her position, and in fact are contrary to it. None of them supports Wife's theory that,
when the lump sum distribution occurred, the defined benefit plan formula became inapplicable both as to past and future benefits. In Mann v. Mann, 22 Va. App. 459, 470
S.E.2d 605 (1996), the court was dealing with a defined contribution plan, not a defined
benefit plan. The court adopted a method of division of the account consistent with the
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trial court's treatment of Husband's 401(k) plan in the instant case. 470 S.E.2d at 60708. In Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), the court was reviewing division of a defined contribution plan, not a defined benefit plan. 22 S.W.3d at 149. Similarly, the retirement plan at issue in In re Marriage of Hester, 122 Or. App. 147, 856 P.2d
1048 (1991) was a defined contribution plan. 856 P.2d at 1049. In Tanghe v. Tanghe,
115 P.3d 567 (Alaska 2005), the court disapproved use of a coverture fraction in division
of a 401 (k) defined contribution plan. 115 P.3d at 570-71. Paulone v. Paulone, 437 Pa.
Super. 130, 649 A.2d 691 (1994), also involved a defined benefit plan. 649 A.2d at 694.
None of those cases presented the situation the case at bar presents, where defined benefit
plan benefits had been earned both before and during the marriage, and then converted to
present value and deposited in an account as lump sums.
3.

Wife's Commingling Argument Is Without Merit Because Evidence Supported the Trial Court's Finding
that Separate Property Remained Identifiable.

Wife's argument that the separate funds lost their separate character by being left
in the accounts with marital funds was rejected by the trial court and is easily disposed of.
In essence, Wife is arguing that the defined benefit plan payments can no longer be separately identified once they are rolled over into an account that carries a cash balance.
Wife's argument is a challenge to the trial court's factual finding that the funds were
separately identifiable. Wife has not marshaled the applicable evidence. Mr. Smith testified that although marital and separate funds were deposited together, they could still be
traced and separately identified. (R. 370, p. 228.) The mere act of converting Husband's
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benefits to a lump sum did not change the fact that a large majority of those benefits were
his separate property, and could be identified as such using the Woodward formula.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Ascertained the Marital Portion of
the 401(h) Plan.

In contrast to the Basic Retirement Plan and DCP, the 401(k) plan is a defined
contribution plan. That means that it had an account value at the date of the marriage. In
that situation, Utah law calls for a different analysis, which requires the court to "award
premarital property, and appreciation on that property, to the spouse who brought the
property into the marriage." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 K 18, 45 P.3d 176 (emphasis added).
The issue of accrued interest on the premarital portion of the retirement account should be analyzed pursuant to the general rules regarding
premarital property and separate property. The general rule is that equity
requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into
the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property
We agree with the lower court that Dr. Dunn is entitled to his premarital contributions to the retirement account. Because the record does
not indicate that Mrs. Dunn, through her efforts, augmented, maintained, or
protected the separate property, other than her maintenance of the household accounts, we agree with the lower court that Dr. Dunn is also entitled
to all interest attributable to those contributions.
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In the present case, Husband presented just such an analysis of his 401(k) account.
Starting with the date-of-marriage balance of $21,251.12, Mr. Smith determined the annual rate of return or loss on the 401(k) plan from the date of the marriage through the
present. He applied that rate of return to the $21,251.12, which had grown to $64,318.85.
The remaining funds in the account, which consisted of contributions during the marriage
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and earnings on those contributions, were segregated out to be included in the marital estate in this case.
Wife attacks the trial court's acceptance of Mr. Smith's method of calculating the
rate of return the 401(k) plan earned during the marriage. The court's determination of
the appropriate rate of return to be applied to Husband's premarital balance was a factual
finding which is entitled to deference on appeal. Wife's brief fails to marshal the evidence on this point, which clearly supports the trial court's findings.
Without any factual basis, Wife contends that the analysis failed to isolate earnings from contributions. To the contrary, Mr. Smith explained in great detail how he had
isolated passive earnings from contributions. Those calculations permitted Mr. Smith to
isolate the rate of grown or investment value, or what Wife in her brief refers to as "passive" appreciation. (R. 369, p. 71; R. 370, pp. 122-23, 134.)
So what you did is you had actual data for contributions, company matches
and loans and the only other thing that could cause a change from the beginning to ending balance is earnings. So you took out those three components, the contributions, the match and the loans and you're left with what
the earnings is.
A.

Correct. (R. 370, p. 134.)

There is no merit to Wife's contention that the rate of return calculated by Mr.
Smith, and adopted by the trial court, included more than passive growth in investment
value during the marriage.
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C.

The Trial Court Erred In Including a Portion of the DCP In
the Marital Estate.

While the trial court's application of Woodward to the DCP was correct if it was
marital property, Husband asserts as part of his cross-appeal that the trial court erred in
including the DCP in the marital estate. The trial court's handling of the DCP is in some
respects unclear in that it appears the court may have accepted the proposition that the
DCP was separate property yet included it in the marital estate as one of its "equitable adjustments:"
The Court rejects respondent's contention that the DCP is entirely a
premarital asset. The Court believes that there needs to be some recognition that, even though the plan's benefit level was frozen under the DCP
prior to the marriage, the parties work together during the years of the marriage allowed Mr. Oliekan to retire, and respondent was required to be an
employee on the date of retirement in order to qualify for the benefit. The
Court's decision to include the entire DCP as a marital asset is an equitable
adjustment for the time of petitioner's contribution to the marriage (see
paragraph 15). (R. 318^31.)
To the extent the trial court's justification is limited to the "equitable adjustment"
theory, it is discussed below under Point III as a violation of the "exceptional circumstances" requirement of Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
To the extent the decision was a rejection of Husband's separate property claim
for a reason other than as an "equitable adjustment," the decision was erroneous. The
facts were clear that benefits under the DCP were frozen in 1990 and that the only thing
Husband received from the DCP was the benefit he had earned as of 1990, adjusted by an
interest rate calculation. The DCP thus was a classic situation for application of the rule
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that "trial courts are . . . required to award premarital property, and appreciation on that
property, to the spouse who brought the property into the marriage." Elman, 2002 UT
App 83 Tf 18.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S "EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENTS" WERE
INAPPROPRIATE.

The trial court's "equitable adjustments" were not based on a finding of extraordinary circumstances, and therefore under Utah law were an abuse of the court's discretion
to fashion an equitable property division. Separate property that has not been commingled or augmented by marital effort can only be included in the marital estate under extraordinary circumstances. Although separate property is not "totally beyond [a] court's
reach in an equitable property division," Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), the court may award the separate property of one spouse to the other spouse
only in "'extraordinary situations where equity so demands.'" Id. (quoting Mortensen,
760 P.2d at 308). In general, in order to include separate property in the marital estate, or
to divide marital property unequally, the court must support its decision with "commendably detailed findings" memorializing the exceptional circumstances supporting the
decision. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 ^27, 993 P.2d 887; Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239123,987 P.2d 603.
The trial court in this case made no finding of exceptional circumstances. Rather,
it concluded that the presumed growth in premarital retirement assets during the marriage
entitled Wife to a portion of those assets. As discussed above, that alleged growth is illusory and based on the flawed proposition, rejected elsewhere by the trial court, that Ex-
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hibit P-4 established a meaningful premarital value for the defined benefit plans. Having
accepted the premise that the increase in separate property during the marriage was passive, the trial court necessarily violated the Elman standard by attempting to gerrymander
the property division to give Wife a share of that passive increase. Because the trial
court's justification for the "equitable adjustments" is infirm, those adjustments were an
abuse of the court's discretion and must be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN INCLUDING THE ENTIRE LENOX COLLECTION IN THE MARITAL
ESTATE.

For the reasons discussed in the Statement of Facts, the trial court erred in including the entire Lenox collection in the marital estate. The evidence that $3,120.35 in value
of the Lenox collection was either acquired prior to marriage or was inherited from Husband's mother was uncontroverted. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in
including the entire Lenox collection in the marital estate.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO TREAT HUSBAND'S
$2,100 PER MONTH RETIREMENT WITHDRAWALS AS
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS CHARGEABLE TO HIS SHARE
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WAS ERRONEOUS.

Following entry of the Temporary Order in this case, Husband continued his preseparation practice of withdrawing $2,100 per month from the Basic Retirement Plan.
Between entry of the order and conclusion of trial, $33,600 had been withdrawn. The
court found these withdrawals to violate the Temporary Order's prohibition against alienating marital property.
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The trial court's decision to charge the $33,600 in withdrawals to husband's share
of the marital estate was necessarily based on an implicit finding of contempt. In civil
contempt proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a valid court order existed, that the defendant had knowledge of the order,
and that the defendant disobeyed the order. Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Hawaii, Inc. v. Bad
Ass Coffee Ltd Partnership, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1255 n.7 (D. Utah 2000) {citing Cheff
v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)).
In the instant case, those requirements were not met. Although the court's order
prohibited dissipation of marital assets, it was entered in the context of an order requiring
payment of temporary alimony, which in turn was based upon an affidavit of Wife that
treated the $2,100 per month retirement withdrawals as income, not property. The order
did not specifically prohibit continuation of the $2,100 per month withdrawals, which had
been instituted immediately upon Husband's retirement in March, 2001, nearly two years
before the order was entered. Wife's own affidavit established that Husband did not have
the ability to comply with the financial obligations imposed by the Temporary Order
without continuation of the monthly withdrawals. Husband reasonably believed that the
order did not reach his continuing monthly retirement income. Under the circumstances,
the evidence does not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Husband
knowingly disobeyed the court's order by not suspending his retirement withdrawals
when the Temporary Order was entered.
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VI.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD WAS ERRONEOUS
WHEN CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS RULING
ON WITHDRAWALS IN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE
TEMPORARY ORDER.

"w[T]he most important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent
the wife from becoming a public charge.'" English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah
1979 (quoting Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971)). With this purpose
in mind, the Court in English articulated three factors that must be considered in fixing a
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the
husband to provide support. Id. at 411-12.
In this case, the trial court's alimony award is erroneous in two respects. First, the
trial court treated alimony as though it wa*<an entitlement of Wife. In so doing, it failed
to take into account the admitted fact that Wife's financial circumstances were essentially
unchanged after the marriage from what they had been before the marriage. Wife was
working at the same job, with the same benefits (including retirement benefits) as she had
prior to marriage. Husband was required to pay all marital debt, which left Wife essentially debt-free following the divorce. The only material negative change was that the
$7,000 in equity she had in her home prior to marriage (R. 370, p. 282) was consumed by
the parties during the marriage. (R. 312 ^f 9.) In circumstances where the spouse claiming alimony has not suffered a material financial setback as a result of the marriage, and
the standard of living during the marriage was roughly what it had been before the mar-
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riage, the function of alimony is not implicated and alimony should not be awarded. See
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (requiring consideration of "financial condition" of recipient spouse).
More importantly, however, the trial court erred in its inconsistent treatment of
Husband's $2,100 per month withdrawals from the Basic Retirement Plan. In justifying a
$33,600 reduction in Husband's share of the marital estate, the trial court treated withdrawals as property, even though Wife had characterized the withdrawals as income in
her moving papers. In other words, the court in interpreting the Temporary Order at trial
decided that the withdrawals were not income to Husband. The trial court did not treat
Wife's income while the case was pending in the same manner. To the extent Wife spent
her income, funds that otherwise would have been included in the marital estate escaped
such treatment. Even though Husband's monthly retirement withdrawals were used in
exactly the same manner as Wife's income, for living expenses and to maintain debt payments, the trial court treated his withdrawals as property rather than income, reducing
only Husband's portion of the marital estate.
When the trial court turned to the consideration of alimony, however, it changed
its treatment of Husband's retirement withdrawals, characterizing them as income rather
than property as using them as the justification for requiring Husband to pay $500 per
month for 118 months, a total of $59,000, to Wife. While retirement income can certainly be taken into consideration in setting alimony, the trial court in this case erred in its
inconsistent treatment of the withdrawals as property for one purpose and income for another. Husband believes that the withdrawals are more appropriately treated as income
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rather than property, but either the alimony award must be reversed or the decision to
treat the $33,600 in withdrawals as an advance on Husband's share of marital property
must be reversed. The result imposed by the trial court was not only inconsistent, but inequitable and contrary to law.
VII.

THE TRIAL ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
WIFE.

In divorce cases, an award of attorney's fees "must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
"The award of attorney fees is a highly fact-dependent process. Indeed, in determining
reasonable attorney fees, this court has set out factors that should be considered. These
factors include, but are not limited to, 'the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved
in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.'" Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 232 (Utah 1997).
In the present case, the trial court failed to take into consideration the severe financial burdens placed on Husband by the division of the marital estate in this case. In
addition to the depletion of retirement assets resulting from the sale of the marital residence, which had negative equity (R. 316 ^f 22), and the imbalance in distribution caused
by all of the court's "equitable adjustments," the court imposed all of the parties' debt on
husband, totaling some $65,000 {see ex. D-l). Husband also had the burden of his own
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litigation expenses. The court's justification, that Wife "needs to preserve the retirement
assets she has been awarded as she grows older," (R. 326 ^ 68) rings hollow when the
court considers that the marital portion of the retirement assets was divided equally, and
Husband had the same need. The court's other justification, that Husband had a greater
ability than Wife to earn additional income to pay the fees, was a simple conclusion unsupported by appropriately detailed factual findings. Indeed, the relevant facts, found by
the court in Findings 63 and 64, were that Husband had no surplus income. The only
way for Husband to meet the obligation imposed by the court was to withdraw funds
from retirement and incur income tax and penalties in doing so.
In essence, the award of attorney's fees to Wife was a back-door method of awarding her a disproportionate $7,500 from the marital estate. The facts found by the court
did not support its conclusions of need or ability to pay, and the award was inequitable
and erroneous. Certainly, Wife's contention that more should have been awarded cannot
withstand the rigors of the abuse of discretion standard applicable to review of a trial
court's award of attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Husband requests that this Court affirm the division of
the Basic Retirement Plan and the 401(k) Plan; that it reverse the division of the Deferred
Compensation Plan and direct that the entire amount of that plan is Husband's separate
property; that it reverse the trial court's treatment of withdrawals from the retirement accounts to the extent set forth in this brief; that it reverse the trial court's "equitable adjustments;" that it reverse the inclusion of the entire Lenox collection in the marital es-39-

tate; that it reverse the alimony award; and that it reverse the award of attorney's fees to
Wife.
DATED this J ^ d a y of November, 2005.
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